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Abstract 
 
Deportation,  understood as the physical removal of someone  against  their will from 
the territory of one state  to that of another,  has moved  to the forefront of academic 
and policy agendas.  Although there  is a growing literature  on legislation and policy, 
there is very little in-depth  data on what happens post-deportation. In this article, we 
examine  possible   post-deportation  outcomes.   We  argue   that,  whatever   reasons 
existed for people  to migrate in the ﬁrst place, deportation adds to these and creates 
at least three  additional  reasons  that  make adjustment, integration,  or reintegration 
difﬁcult, if not impossible. These include the impossibility of repaying debts  incurred 
by migration, the existence of transnational and local ties, the shame of failure, and the 
perceptions of ‘contamination’. We draw on a mixture of quantitative  and qualitative 
data  gathered in Europe and Afghanistan to argue  that  many deported Afghans at- 
tempt  and succeed  in re-migrating. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The beginning of the twenty-first century has seen a sharp rise in a practice acknowledged 
to be brutal, expensive, and ineffective (Schuster 2005; Gibney and Hansen 2003; Collyer 
2012). States have increased the use of deportation arguing that is it a necessary weapon in 
the battle against undocumented  migration, a means to remove those with no right to 
remain within a given territory, and a deterrent to others intending to circumvent migra- 
tion controls1 although there is no evidence to support this and, as we will show, growing 
evidence to the contrary. Undocumented migration continues apace, and many of those 
deported re-migrate, leading us to question the justifiability and utility of deportation. 
Academic literature on deportation  has tended to focus on the earlier stages of the 
process, exploring the difficulties of removing rejected asylum seekers (Noll 1997, 1999; 
Phuong 2005), resistance against deportation (Nyers 2003), and the dangers and injustices 
 
  
 
of the deportation experience (Fekete 2005; Tazreiter 2006; Kanstroom 2007). There is also 
a growing body of literature on the place of deportation in the state’s anti-migration arsenal 
(Ellerman 2008, 2009; Schuster 2005) and increasingly on the theoretical implications of 
the ‘normalization’ of deportation (Bloch and Schuster 2005) or what Gibney (2008) has 
referred to as the ‘deportation turn’ (see also De Genova and Peutz 2010). With Zilberg 
(2011: 4), we note that much of the theorizing on deportation configures it as a means of 
rendering undesirable people immobile. However, what emerges from the empirical data 
presented here is that  deportation  cannot  render  people permanently  immobile, that 
though individual capacity for action and mobility is constrained by state action, it is 
not eradicated. 
All of the above studies and the recent special issue of Citizenship Studies (2011) have 
tended to focus on flaws in the pre-deportation system that lead to people being unjustly 
removed, potentially to danger. Experiences pre- and during deportation, and the injustices 
that may accompany them, shape what happens to people post-deportation and are clearly 
important. However, in spite of some excellent studies, including by Brotherton (2008), 
Brotherton and Barrios (2009), the Edmund Rice Centre (2006), Khosravi (2009), and 
Peutz (2006, 2010), relatively little is known about what happens to people in the months 
and years that follow deportation (Collyer 2012), that is, whether once removed they stay 
away, or whether other potential migrants are discouraged from migration. Whereas there 
is an established and expanding body of literature on what happens to people who decide to 
return to their countries of birth or previous residence (Dumon 1986; Hammond 1999; 
Arowolo 2000; Cassarino 2004; Hughes 2011) and on those returned as part of an INGO 
sponsored programme (Marsden 1999; Black, Collyer, and Somerville 2011), the work on 
those returned against their will is more limited, though growing (Ruben, Van Houte and 
Davids 2009). Given the claims made by states about  the centrality of deportation  to 
migration controls and to ‘maintaining the integrity of the asylum system’ (NAO 2005: 
10),  and  the  recommendation   in  the  EU  Returns  Directive  that  there  should  be 
post-deportation  monitoring, this lack of emphasis on what happens after forced return 
may seem surprising.2 
Our focus, therefore, is on post-deportation,  that is, what happens to people who are 
removed as part of migration controls from one country to another (not  always their 
country of origin)3  against their will, and why so many re-migrate.4  Our  argument is 
that the experience of deportation is likely to make adjustment, integration, or reintegra- 
tion difficult if not impossible, and creates three additional reasons to re-migrate. These 
include deepening economic opportunity  losses and the impossibility of repaying debts 
incurred by the initial departure, the social existence or lack thereof of transnational and 
local ties and responsibilities, and finally the socio-cultural shame of failure and the sus- 
picions of the community. 
The focus on Afghanistan in our research and in this article is explained both by the 
country’s position among the top three refugee-producing countries in the world (UNHCR 
2012a), and  by the high number  of people deported  to that  country  in recent years. 
Afghanistan has a long and complex migration history. Migration has been integral to 
this region for centuries, creating links and ties that unite communities across relatively 
recent borders (Schmeidl and Maley 2008; Majidi 2009; Koser and Martin 2011). This 
movement has never been unidirectional; instead trade, employment, and marriage have 
  
 
seen people move back and forth, often returning to Afghanistan only to leave again or to 
see younger generations leave. Overlaying this complex migration history is the forced 
migration occasioned by more than 30 years of more or less intense conflict which has 
massively increased the numbers of people leaving—forced migrations that have been 
followed at different points by forced returns as neighbouring states have from time to 
time pushed people back (Harpviken et al. 2004; IPS 2009; Schuster 2010). As conflict has 
ebbed and flowed, almost six million people have returned with and without the assist- 
ance of UN-sponsored voluntary assisted programmes, increasing the population  of a 
country with little infrastructure by 25% (UNHCR 2012a).5 This period also saw many 
Afghans travelling further  afield, seeking asylum in Europe, North  America, and 
Australasia, and  a sharp  increase in the number  of deportations  from  those regions. 
This situation is likely to worsen given the pressures on the security situation throughout 
Afghanistan, the lack of any political resolution to the ongoing conflict in the country, 
and the upcoming transition phase of 2014 when foreign troops will withdraw leaving 
Afghans facing an uncertain and volatile economic and political future. 
The permanent challenge of tracking and monitoring migrants (Peutz 2006) and the lack 
of reliable figures on those forcibly returned remain key obstacles to a thorough assessment 
of return. This article is not based on a single piece of research, but rather on different pieces 
of research conducted over the last 4 years by Majidi in Afghanistan and on ongoing work 
by Schuster in France, the UK, and Afghanistan, as well as insights gained by both authors 
in the course of advocacy and campaign work in Afghanistan, France, and the UK and 
conversations with the families of those deported. All interlocutors were clear that Schuster 
and Majidi were researchers and would write about their experiences. Some saw and com- 
mented on an early version of this article. Our interlocutors could and did specify what, if 
any, personal information could be used. All the names have been changed, but ages (where 
available), gender, and family situation are accurate. 
Majidi’s research  with  100  returnees  (of  whom  fifty had  been  deported)  using 
closed-ended  questionnaires   and   a   team   of  interviewers  in   three   provinces  of 
Afghanistan (Kabul, Nangarhar, and Balkh) in 2009 and 2011 offers a longitudinal per- 
spective on a small sample of people deported who had been assisted through  the UK 
Return and Reintegration Fund. These studies were conducted for the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) and carried out as part of a study into the outcomes of 
the UK Return and Reintegration Fund and the activities of its operational partners on the 
ground, the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The methodology was based 
on a quantitative survey with forced returnees randomly selected from available beneficiary 
listings, and completed with a qualitative survey with focus group discussions and indi- 
vidual case studies. Those selected in 2009 were then re-interviewed in 2011 to obtain a 
longitudinal perspective of their post-deportation experience. 
Schuster’s multi-country  fieldwork from 2008 to the present with thirty young men 
in Paris and  six of their  extended families in Afghanistan provides a more  in-depth 
qualitative view of return  experiences. Schuster’s findings emerge from  conversations 
with Afghans in a variety of situations in France over a period of 4 years and over three 
visits to  Afghanistan and  with some of their  families over a 15-month  period.  The 
ongoing  relationships  in  Paris allowed more  complex and  nuanced  accounts  of the 
post-deportation  experience to emerge, and facilitated the creation of relationships of 
  
 
 
trust  in Afghanistan. Initially contact  with families was for the purpose  of delivering 
gifts from family members in Paris, but Schuster’s description of her work and research 
interests in response to queries would inevitably lead to discussions. Subsequently con- 
sent to use this information—anonymized—was sought and granted. The conversations 
were recorded in a detailed diary as soon as possible afterwards, and findings and 
questions that emerged during the writing of the diary would be raised with the speaker 
and/or  other Afghans in person or by phone subsequently as a way of validating and 
triangulating the conclusions. 
Those interviewed, formally and informally, are overwhelmingly young males, since very 
few Afghan women travel independently outside the country, but the commonality ends 
there. These young men (the oldest is 40) are a heterogeneous group: the length of time out 
of Afghanistan before deportation varied from 3 months to 8 years, some were university 
educated and some illiterate, some were returned to the country in which they had been 
born and grown up, whereas others were returned to a country they did not know at all, 
having been born and raised in Iran or in a refugee camp in Pakistan. Among the inter- 
viewees, those deported from Iran tended to be poorer and less educated, whereas those 
deported from Europe were more mixed in socio-economic terms including a high pro- 
portion  of educated young men. We cite a small number of women in the article, but 
cannot yet draw firm conclusions on the impact that gender makes to the post-deportation 
experience because the number is so small. 
Scholars  working  on  those  deported   to  Cameroon   (Alpes  2012),  Cape  Verde 
(Drotbohm   2011),  the   Dominican   Republic  (Brotherton   and   Barrios  2011),  El 
Salvador (Hagen,  Eschbach, and  Rodriguez 2008; Zilberg 2011), Somaliland  (Peutz 
2006), and Sri Lanka (Collyer 2012), as well as Afghanistan, Armenia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Vietnam,6  have found that the majority of those 
who are deported want to, will attempt to, and often do leave again. Frequently, their stay 
or sojourn in the countries to which they are deported represents a temporary return or 
break before a new phase in the migration  cycle (Peutz 2006; Hagen, Eschbach, and 
Rodriguez 2008). In part this is due to what Cassarino (2004) identifies as returnee 
preparedness and returnee resource mobilization—people are more likely to be able to 
settle if they have been able to prepare their return,  to convert assets and send them 
home, or to set up opportunities or support structures. Those who are deported are those 
who are returned against their will—they do not want to go and so these migrants are 
not prepared for their return and do not have access to resources that would facilitate or 
justify such a return. As de Haas (2005) notes, it is unrealistic to expect those deported to 
settle somewhere they do not want to be. As we will show below, this frequently creates 
an impulse to re-migrate in order to achieve goals thwarted by deportation.  Some of 
these use their  enforced return  to  rest, recuperate, catch up  with their  families and 
discuss the  further  investment  required  by another  migration  attempt.  Others  leave 
almost  immediately or  at  least as soon  as they can,  avoiding making  contact  with 
family or friends. In what follows, we explore some of the factors that make a difference 
as to whether people deported manage to stay and make a life in Afghanistan, or leave to 
try and make one elsewhere (the most common attempted scenario), before considering 
some cases where people have settled. 
  
 
2. Factors inhibiting sustainable return and  encouraging 
re-migration 
As noted above, the existing data from scholars and studies across the world indicate that 
most of those deported want, and will attempt, to leave again. If, following deportation, 
there has been little or no structural improvement to security, the economy, the political 
situation, or their individual perspectives, then the push to leave a country will be the same 
as before, especially if people are forced to return before they are ready, or before they 
choose to do so themselves.7 
The argument in this article is that whatever reasons existed for people to migrate in the 
first place, deportation adds to these and creates at least three additional reasons that make 
adjustment, integration, or reintegration difficult if not impossible. These include deepen- 
ing economic opportunity losses and the impossibility of repaying debts incurred by the 
initial departure, the social existence (or lack thereof ) of transnational and local ties and 
responsibilities, and finally the socio-cultural shame of failure and the suspicions of the 
community. 
Afghanistan’s economy  remains  fragile and  unable  to  support  its population  and 
absorb the high numbers  of refugees and migrants that  have returned  in the past 10 
years. Large numbers  of Afghans continue  to migrate or remain  abroad. Iran, where 
wages are up to four times higher than in Afghanistan (Majidi 2008), is a key destin- 
ation for irregular Afghan migrant workers, even though deportation  is almost an 
occupational hazard. In 2007, the government of Iran recorded over 400,000 deport- 
ations; in 2011 the number  had decreased to 211,023 (UNHCR 2012b), which none- 
theless represents a deportation  figure of 578 per day from Iran. Afghans recognize the 
high risk of deportation. Some have been deported once, twice, or even three times but 
continue  this migration for its economic benefits, sending back regular remittances to 
their families in Afghanistan who are either entirely or highly dependent on this income 
(Majidi 2008). 
Against this backdrop of forced economic migration, a report by the European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO 2012) showed that in 2011, 28,000 Afghans applied for asylum in the 
EU, the highest number in the decade since the beginning of the war. In 2012, these figures 
reached an all-time high with more than 30,000 asylum applications, with actual numbers 
for those leaving likely to be far higher than those seeking asylum (The Telegraph 2012). 
These numbers are undoubtedly  increasing. Afghanistan remains one of the top three 
refugee-producing countries in the world, with record asylum applications in Europe in 
2012. Whereas most of those deported from Iran are undocumented workers, most of those 
deported from outside the region are those whose claims for asylum on the basis of per- 
secution have been rejected. However, an impressive piece of work by the Edmund Rice 
Centre in Australia (ERC 2006) followed rejected asylum seekers, including 40 Afghans, 
and found that some of those rejected by the Australian government were returned  to 
Afghanistan but forced to flee again to Pakistan. It found evidence that nine of those 
returned  had been killed. Clearly, those who do not wish to return  because of fear of 
persecution will leave again if that is possible. Majidi’s research has shown that when 
family members sent abroad to safety are deported, the family will respond by sending 
  
them away again—in some cases further away. This is especially the case for unaccompan- 
ied minors.8 
Whereas those migrating to neighbouring states often plan to return after 2 or 3 years, 
this seems to be less the case with those migrating outside the region. Rather than con- 
centrating on earning as much money as possible, those deported from Europe seem to 
have been more willing to enrol in school or university, to spend time on training courses, 
and to have stable employment, planning to settle permanently. Families are increasingly 
sending to Europe at least one of their sons as an investment on their future. Alternatively, 
heads of households leave their young families behind with their parents or in-laws while 
they apply for asylum, hoping then for family reunification. In these cases, the intention to 
migrate is long-term with the expectations and hopes of entire families resting on one 
person’s journey. As we will show below, such projects are unlikely to be abandoned even 
post-deportation. 
Attempts by INGOs and foreign governments to create the structures that will encourage 
Afghans to return and remain have tended to focus on individuals deported from Europe, 
though some, such as HELP in Herat, are working with those deported from Iran. First 
AGEF, and now IOM, have been contracted to offer small payments and courses to improve 
skills in the hope that people might set up businesses, enrol in qualification training courses 
to learn computer  skills or English, or undertake vocational training programmes that 
will teach them a specific technical skill in just 6 months. However, problems ranging 
from the inadequacy of these programmes to fit with the profile of returnees and local 
contexts, to their inability to create or maintain the infrastructures that would allow these 
individuals to capitalize on the limited resources provided, mean that many of the partici- 
pants in such programmes will once again see migration as an appropriate survival strategy 
(Majidi 2008, 2009).9 
In addition to the conflict and poverty that caused people to leave in the first place, 
deportation  adds three factors that make re-migration even more likely: the loss of eco- 
nomic and educational opportunities and the impossibility of repaying debts incurred by 
earlier attempts to migrate; transnational and local ties in the countries of destination, 
exile, and return; and a socio-cultural feeling of shame and perceptions of ‘contamination’. 
We shall discuss each of these issues in turn. 
 
 
2.1 Economic opportunity loss and debt 
 
International migration is an expensive business, one that usually requires family support. 
An early study by Ilahi and Jafarey (1999) found that 46 per cent of migrants from Pakistan 
relied on family loans. For those who are leaving because of under- or unemployment, it 
often entails borrowing money that is to be repaid once employment has been found in the 
destination country. Sending a family member abroad, especially out of the region, con- 
stitutes a major investment on the part of the family, who may sell land, goods, or valuables 
on the assumption they will be repaid one day through the labours of the member abroad 
(Carling and Carratero 2006). For many families, these assets are an insurance against 
adversity, or a form of saving for the next generation. New arrivals in Paris told Schuster 
of the fine calculations that had been made as to what the family back home could afford 
and how they would survive in the 2 or 3 years it may take someone to establish themselves. 
  
 
However, people travelling overland often find that they run out of money on the way and 
are obliged to request further loans from other family members to complete their journey. 
 
We thought the journey would take one or two months, but we were stuck for four 
months in Greece and a month in Serbia – the whole journey took eight months. 
When we left we paid E8,000 for all of us to get to Europe. But we did not know what 
Greece was like. We have to  keep calling home  and  asking for more  money. 
Now we owe E25,000. How can we pay this back? (Tamana,10  24) 
After my husband died, we sent my eldest son to Sweden. It was quick for him and 
did not cost so much, so it was decided I should follow with the other two children – 
but it was different for us.11 It has been a year and it has cost E40,000. (Nooria, 37) 
 
Deportation represents a crisis for such families, not just the individual involved—a crisis 
that must be resolved. If someone is deported before debts can be repaid, and if they are 
unlikely to be able to repay it post-deportation,  there is a strong incentive to re-migrate, 
even if that means increasing the original debt. Debts, whether to family members or to 
more formal lenders, cannot be written off and those lenders recognize that their best chance 
of repayment is through financing re-migration. Smugglers provide different packages for 
re-migration to facilitate and provide an incentive to leave again. They can either loan the 
money directly and recuperate it against wages in the country of destination (usually Iran) 
or loan the money to the migrant and obtain a reimbursement from an employer in the 
country of destination, leading to situations of bonded labour. These packages frequently 
offer two or three attempts to cross a given border (Majidi 2008). These ‘multiple attempts 
packages’ are a way to respond to setbacks en route and to deportation. 
Young Afghans in Paris explained that the first money borrowed was on the basis of 
unrealistic expectations, but that now they had actually made the journey, and understood 
what was and was not possible in Europe, they were more confident of being able to repay 
the debt. When questioned about the difficulty of regularizing their situation a second time 
round  because their fingerprints would be in the Schengen Information  System (a 
European fingerprint database), there was acceptance that they would have to work without 
papers, but as one interviewee put it, ‘In UK I can get money to pay in two years – there 
[Afghanistan] it will never be possible’. When this young man was asked about the danger 
of being deported again, he replied that he would come again, though it would take him 
longer to pay his debts: ‘I cannot stay in Afghanistan – there is no future for me there’ 
(Amiri, 23). 
However, taking loans or incurring debts is a common coping strategy for all Afghan 
households, whether urban or rural, poor, or middle-class, in a country with no proper 
banking system. Households rely on relatives and friends for debts to pay for migration, but 
also to build a home, obtain medical treatment, send children to school, purchase a car, or 
(for the most destitute) purchase food. But deportation represents a particular economic 
setback because of the opportunities foregone by migrants. Deported Afghans are for the 
most part young males, who left to find a better life, work, and a stable situation abroad, at a 
time when instead they could have attended school, university, learned a skill, or found 
employment. The key formative years, between the ages of sixteen and thirty, are spent 
preparing for migration, travelling a dangerous irregular route, then spending another few 
years in the asylum system in Europe, or working on construction  sites in Iran. Once 
  
deported, sometimes after five, ten, or more years abroad, they come back with no im- 
provement in their education, skills, or working experience. They come back to the same, or 
worsening, structural conditions, without any improvement in their own potential. The 
feeling of having ‘wasted time’ and lost opportunities that could have been, in hindsight, 
more interesting in Afghanistan, is a reality that they have a difficult time adapting to. In 
part to convince themselves that they did not leave for nothing in the first place, they decide 
to leave again. 
 
I left Kabul before starting university. I had very good grades and could have gone to 
university, but I preferred, and my family agreed, to go to the university in Europe. 
I decided to go to the UK at the age of 18 hoping that I would get enrolled there. But 
it never happened. Six years later, I was deported. All I had ever done was deliver 
food. This is not a skill I can use here in Kabul. I realize there is nothing I learned that 
can be used here for an income. I have no education, no skills, I am the same person 
as I was when I left, but almost ten years older now. (Qais, 27) 
 
The economic and educational opportunity loss has a broader impact than just on the 
individual. Its repercussions are collective. When debts are incurred to send one person 
abroad, that is, a young promising son, the expectations at home are that this will be the 
solution to the many—mostly economic—problems of the household. Often, especially in 
the case of Afghans deported from Iran, families that stayed behind depended exclusively 
on that person’s remittances. The expectation is that of a quick, if not immediate, return on 
investment. This is often times easily achieved with migrants to Iran (Majidi 2008) repaying 
the cost of their migration within a week or a month, before sending regular remittances. 
However, those deported from Europe face a tougher reality: in many cases, not only have 
their skills not improved, they have been unable to send regular remittances, and have not 
been able to repay debts. When they return empty handed, it is the entire family that bears 
the indebtedness and economic losses. This leads to a downgrading of the family’s assets 
and strategies, hence justifying and necessitating incurring more debts to fulfil another 
migration attempt. 
 
 
2.2 Transnational and  local ties 
 
Deportation can occur at any time, from hours after arrival to many years later (Peutz 2006; 
Kanstroom 2007; Hagan, Eschbach and Rodriguez 2008). If the person being deported has 
close family in the deporting country, especially if he or she is responsible for those left 
behind such as children, the impulse to return is very strong. Scholars such as those just 
mentioned have interviewed people deported from the USA, who have families there to 
whom they are determined to return. Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez (2008) note that 
whether the person deported is supporting family in the country of origin or the deporting 
country, deportation means their families are left without support. There is much less work 
done on those families in Europe who have been separated by deportation,  but similar 
concerns and questions are raised. It is, for example, very difficult for a parent who has 
been deported to maintain contact with children left behind in Europe, much less support 
them when they have been returned  to poverty. Such separations make (re)-settling in 
Afghanistan almost impossible. 
  
 
In the case of Iran, ties in the deporting country are even more complex and entrenched, 
due to decades of migration and cross-border movements between the two countries. 
The act of deporting migrants to countries of origin, or countries of citizenship, assumes 
that this country constitutes ‘home’ for the person deported, or that it is where his or her 
family and  support  system are located. Ties to  the country  of return,  in the case of 
Afghanistan, are complicated  by multiple  migration  and  displacement  episodes over 
many decades. Many migrants who are picked up  in Europe have not  come directly 
from Afghanistan: they lived in Iran either as refugees with their families or irregularly 
on their own before heading west. Their families and homes are not in their country of 
origin, they may actually still be living as refugees in exile. In the specific case of unaccom- 
panied minors, a large number of Afghans interviewed in France grew up as refugees in Iran 
and as a result look, sound, and act more Iranian than Afghan. Isaq (aged 26), interviewed 
in Paris, is teased by friends for his Isfahani accent and the alleged acquisition of the ‘famed’ 
Isfahani miserliness. For many, their parents, siblings, grandparents, and cousins are in Iran 
and Pakistan, and to a lesser extent European countries. Their forced return to Afghanistan 
is not a return to family or ‘home’, and is often unsustainable without the proper support 
system that  these minors  or young adults need to survive in their country  of origin. 
Deporting individuals ‘home’ to distant relatives and village elders in Afghanistan makes 
no sense in this context. Their decision then is to migrate back as soon as feasible to the 
country of exile if their families are still there, or to the country of most recent residence 
where their siblings and other relatives might be working, albeit irregularly. It was therefore 
not uncommon, in our research, to meet one family with brothers and cousins dispersed in 
Iran, Europe, Australia, and Afghanistan, as illustrated by Besmellah. 
 
I was deported two years ago; my cousin participated in your research yesterday 
since he was deported  from the UK too, less than  six months  ago. The rest of 
our  family is in  Iran,  while one of my brothers  is in  Holland,  where he was 
deported  to because that  is where he had his first fingers prints taken. But we 
also have another  brother  who succeeded to get his case approved, he lives in 
London. We will try to go back to him and attempt to submit a new case. He will 
help us when we arrive there, I can stay with him, before I find a situation of my own. 
(Besmellah, 33) 
 
Majidi’s research on those deported from the UK shows strong ties often remain—either 
through relatives, friends, or intimate relationships in the deporting country (Majidi 2011). 
Afghans who have migrated in recent years either have uncles and cousins from previous 
migration waves living in the UK, or have travelled together with their brothers. Many of 
those deported from the UK leave behind a brother, cousin, or uncle. That tie still serves as a 
pull factor and, during the time when they are back home, as a source of financial and 
material support, as in the case of Ebadullah. 
 
I am not going to stay here for long, I fear for my life. We are four brothers, three of 
us have been deported, but one remains in the UK. He has been able to get his papers. 
He sends us money to help us live while we find a solution. (Ebadullah, 29) 
 
In other cases, it is an intimate relationship, with a girlfriend, fiance´ e or wife, that 
sustains the hope of return to the UK, and that allows the person deported, again through 
  
financial and material resources sent from abroad, to survive the time that they have to be in 
Afghanistan before they can re-migrate. 
 
I arrived two months ago and I am planning to go back since my fiance´ e is in the UK. 
She is there waiting for me. She sends me money here so that I don’t have to work. 
Now I want to go back soon, what is there for me to do here? (Baryalai, 27) 
 
In addition to the pull of extensive transnational networks of families and friends, there is 
the pull of the informal labour market. Iranian employers actively recruit Afghan irregular 
workers in the construction or agricultural sectors (Majidi 2008). Once a good working 
relationship had been established some employers went out of their way to stay in contact 
with workers after they were deported. Some sent on belongings or wages that they were not 
able to collect before being forcefully removed from their workplace. Others kept in touch 
by phone, informing them of possibilities to re-join their workforce. The economic ties 
with Iran are solid as both employers and workers know of the existing labour demand and 
of the low financial and logistical costs to crossing the border into Iran. The cost of mi- 
gration is usually repaid by Afghan migrants within the first month of their arrival in Iran 
(Majidi 2008).12 
In recent interviews (2012), living again in the country of origin was often not accepted 
as an option, whether the young men had been returned 2 months or 2 years prior to the 
interview. Even after return, there is a refusal to accept the inevitability of return or the need 
to reintegrate, because of strong psychological, physical, and ideological divides that have 
been reinforced by the migration experience. Many spoke of the rampant corruption  in 
their country, within the government, and within the labour market. Some refuse to work, 
either because of ties in deporting countries that sustain them or because their perception 
of corruption  and nepotism in the country makes the search for work seem futile. One 
young man rejected working for someone who had voluntarily returned from abroad to set 
up in business and take advantage of the possibilities afforded by reconstruction: 
 
What is the political future of our country? These dual nationals know about fac- 
tories, electricity, roads abroad. But they did not do anything here. They have only 
built buildings that they rent to make money. They have the money to invest in the 
private sector but it only benefits them. I can’t work permanently in Afghanistan 
because the rules are so biased here. (Mustafa, 28) 
 
Having seen how life is ‘over there’ renders them unwilling to accept how life is ‘over 
here’. As Emal (aged 33) put it: ‘What is there for me to do here? At least in the UK they give 
you a chance, while here every one fights for their own good, for their survival, there is no 
humanity.’ There is a disdain for their country of origin, and for ways of life that have 
become alien to them. Even though these young men have been deported from the UK, 
their personal experience of Britain (or France or Germany or the USA) makes it difficult to 
accept life in a harsher environment and pushes them to leave again. 
 
 
2.3 Shame  and  ‘contamination’ 
 
The power of shame should not be underestimated and creates further pressure to migrate. 
Young men in Paris after re-migrating post-deportation  to Afghanistan spoke bitterly of 
  
 
their families’ lack of comprehension of what they had suffered en route to and in Europe, 
and of the difficulties they faced. They had found it very hard to explain European bur- 
eaucracy, or that they would have been deported even though they had committed  no 
crime. In addition, there are comparisons with the sons of other families who regularly send 
back money or equipment, giving rise to the question: ‘If he could take care of his family, 
why can’t you?’ Carling and Carratero in the context of Senegalese migrants echo these 
feelings: ‘Returnees are not only frustrated and angry but also speak of a sense of shame in 
relation to having failed and coming home empty-handed’ (2006: 4, see also Alpes 2012).13 
An Afghan in Paris explained to nods of approval ‘those words are sharper than blades, and 
the wounds do not heal’ (Nemat, 40). The shame is felt not just by the individual deported 
but by the whole family and the only opportunity to purge it is through re-migration. 
A focus group with young men deported from the UK in Kabul highlighted a common 
experience: having fingers pointed at them, and being called ‘the deportee’ (also noted by 
Drotbohm  in relation to those deported to Haiti 2011). In a country where neighbours 
know everything about each other and there is very little room for privacy it is difficult to 
hide a deportation.  In Afghanistan, Majidi (2009) has found similar responses to those 
found by Peutz in Somaliland: ‘those who are returned to Somaliland are potential spoilers 
of the true culture at home’ (2006: 227). Life in the West is sometimes seen by community 
members as having ‘contaminated’ the teenagers and young adults who left for the UK at a 
young age and returned with visible and invisible signs of their cultural change (clothing, 
behaviour, accent etc.). Life in the UK is perceived as having had a negative impact on their 
development. In the case of one young man interviewed in 2009 and again in 2011, from 
Paghman district in Kabul province, his return  home  led to clashes arising from his 
changed perspectives: 
 
They all bother me because I went to the UK. They say I lost my culture, became a 
kafir . . . all sorts of insults. Another deportee – Habib – returned and was killed in 
our village last year. I left because I no longer felt safe. But now I have no employ- 
ment, no stable income, no skills, no future and no family by my side. (Najib, 22) 
 
‘Internal relocation’ is often proposed by courts in Europe as a solution for those who 
cannot be returned to their areas of origin, or to their homes. However, ‘internal relocation’ 
is not feasible in the Afghan context due the essential role played by family networks. Where 
those deported  are seen as shamed or contaminated,  access to such networks may be 
withdrawn. Without networks to offer support and employment opportunities, integration 
into a community is almost impossible. A report published in 2007 by Saito and Hunte 
shows the challenges of complex reintegration, which include the risks of social exclusion 
and discrimination, the lack of any skills that could fit with the Afghan labour market even 
if there were employment opportunities,  and the difficulties of meeting material needs 
during ‘reintegration’. In Afghanistan, there is little other choice but to go back to where 
individuals have social connections. In this case, if someone is rejected by his community, 
re-migration  may be the  only option  given the  socio-economic  infeasibility of local 
integration. 
In the light of these factors, re-migration is often a rational choice—a rational alternative 
to staying and suffering. In the Hagan, Eschbach, and Rodriguez study (2008) 23% of the 
sample had experienced multiple deportations; some of the research subjects had been 
  
deported three times. In the Afghan context, Majidi has noted that most chose to ‘rest and 
recuperate’ following deportation, spending time and catching up with friends and family 
before deciding the ‘next steps’ and making preparations to leave again. Given the difficult 
conditions under which Afghans live in Iran—frequently living on their worksite, in build- 
ings under construction, and without any opportunity for leisure or even to walk outside of 
their workplace—the period after return, whether by force or by choice, is an opportunity 
to get some rest and see their loved ones. In Schuster’s research, it is difficult to tell how 
prevalent this experience is, since deportation  was only one of a number of issues being 
considered, but a number of young men had returned to Paris after being deported to 
Afghanistan. The average time spent in Afghanistan was 3 months for those deported from 
Iran, and 6 months for those from the UK. 
The experience of deportation from the UK is commonly lived as a shock and a catas- 
trophe, the worst case scenario. Having been removed and returned  to Afghanistan by 
force, some buffer time to plan the next steps is needed. As noted above, some enrol in 
assistance programmes, initially provided by AGEF and now by IOM. The support and 
money provided are, contrary to the aims of the programmes, sometimes used to ‘buy time’ 
before leaving again. After the period of assistance and recuperation (usually 6 months) 
ends, many decide to leave and make a new attempt at migration. 
 
He was always thinking about how to gather the money to leave to the UK again. He 
has not been back in the past year: after he was deported, he used to work in a shop 
next to me. Before closing off his business, he told me he had plans to go to Iran, 
work there for a while, until he had money to pay a smuggler to go back to the UK. It 
took him a few months to make up his mind, but once he had decided, that was it, he 
left the next day. He has not been back since or else I would have known. (Abdul 
Wahed) 
 
Many of those deported, whether or not they accept the assistance packages, will leave 
again. Interviewing the same group of individuals in 2009 and 2011, Majidi found that three 
in four had left again—unsure of their destination, but certain that they could not ‘reinte- 
grate’ in their place of return. 
 
 
3. Factors that  facilitate  staying 
 
Although most people who have migrated and are deported seem to leave again, or plan to, 
not all do. A majority of deportations to Afghanistan are from Iran.14  Some people who 
have been forced to return (either directly or indirectly) are now settled in Afghanistan in 
spite of the ongoing lack of security and fluctuating levels of threat, and in spite of the 
limited opportunities that cause many thousands of migrants to leave each year. Reflecting 
on meetings with such deportees and their families in 2011, it seemed that although very 
many deported Afghans return again to Iran, some stay and build a life in Afghanistan. The 
proportion who do appears higher among those deported from Iran than among those who 
had been deported from further away. If this is the case, what factors might explain this? 
Migration to Iran is relatively inexpensive, about US$500 for a single adult male (sig- 
nificantly more for families travelling with women and children), although prices have been 
going up over the last few years due to stricter border controls, and wages are often four 
  
 
times higher than in Afghanistan (Majidi 2008). This means that the family that remains in 
Afghanistan is not under the same pressure to re-migrate to recoup their investment and it 
may make more sense for the family to remain in Afghanistan post-deportation,  just 
sending one male member back (usually without papers) to Iran or further afield to earn 
enough to remit to the family. Part of the calculation may be that given the higher cost of 
living in those countries, the discrimination experienced and the lack of access to higher 
education for children, it makes more sense for one male member to return. In this case, it is 
the wage of the person who re-migrates post-deportation that facilitates the reintegration of 
the family. 
Just as on arrival in a new country, access to networks of family and friends able and 
willing to assist, to accommodate, and to offer support facilitates the integration of new 
migrants into receiving countries (Cassarino 2004), it seems reasonable to assume that such 
networks will also be important  in the first months after deportation.  The existence of 
opportunities to work and or go to school would seem important in cushioning return and 
facilitating the construction of a future, as would transferable capital. In order to try to 
create opportunities  for those deported, some NGOs and some deporting governments 
have set up programmes to create livelihoods and encourage sustainable return (Majidi 
2009). There is some evidence that this is having limited success: 
 
I have an income of 9,000 Afghanis [US$180] for the 6 of us, mostly from livestock. 
IOM provided me with cattle, a few mother sheep, which I still use today for income. 
This has allowed me to have some level of trade that is still operational, so at least 
the help I received then has sustained me to this day and it has already been three 
years. But I do not help in the reconstruction of my country, it is about day-to-day 
survival here. (Shingul, 26) 
My time in the UK was wasted; I did not learn any skill or receive any education that I 
could use when I returned  to Afghanistan in 2009. Instead, it is through  IOM’s 
support that I enrolled in a private institute and learned the computer skills that 
have allowed me to become a technician in this internet company, and to be recently 
promoted to manager. Ironically, it is in Afghanistan, not in the UK, that I learned to 
use a keyboard, a computer, to send emails and go on the internet. (Ibrahim, 32) 
 
Money is clearly important in ensuring survival, as seen from Shingul’s comment above, 
but so too are skills learnt abroad that can be applied ‘at home’. Some Afghans in London 
and Paris, for example, commented enviously on a friend’s language skills: 
 
Listen to him – he speaks French, English, Greek and Turkish. If I was him, I could go 
home and make a fortune – I could work with all the foreign people ‘hey – you need 
anything – you just ask me’. (Mushtaba, 30) 
 
In another case, a young man, deported from the UK in 2009, used his English language 
skills to turn his forced return into a positive and thriving social and economic experience 
at home. Samim quickly found a job as a driver for the German government’s aid agency, 
GIZ, in Kabul. He was placed in this job by AGEF, the organization in charge of his 
‘reintegration’, and now has a stable income and is able to provide for his immediate 
family. However, his ability to capitalize on skills learnt abroad meant that his deportation 
may have encouraged other family members to leave. His brother subsequently went to the 
UK and  was later deported,  leaving behind his fiance´ e. For this brother,  that  fiance´ e 
  
constitutes a strong incentive to leave again, although re-entry will have to be clandestine, 
with all the attendant high financial cost and human risks. 
Some who stay in Afghanistan post-deportation  do not thrive but are unable to leave 
again. Some individuals do  not  have access to  family networks and  remain  isolated. 
This group has no access to the resources necessary to re-commence the journey, which 
may also lead to psychological damage, in some cases worsening the damage inflicted by 
deportation. The ‘loss of face’ occasioned by deportation means that some people do not 
contact their family, but remain in the city to which they have been returned (e.g. Kabul). 
Some will scratch around trying to find odd jobs until they can raise the funds to leave 
again.15 
Staying may mean something akin to confinement, an involuntary immobility, where 
the would-be migrant cannot adjust, integrate, or reintegrate but cannot migrate again. 
We use these terms while acknowledging, with Hammond  (1999) and Black and Gent 
(2006), their inadequacy. As far as we know, there are no studies that examine the successful 
reintegration of deported people back into their (real or supposed) communities of origin, 
so little is known about how or why this happens. Even relatively positive experiences 
following deportation, such as those of Ibrahim and Samim, may have ambiguous out- 
comes.  It  is  important   to  note  that  even  when  people  decide  not  to  leave again 
post-deportation,  contrary to the assumption of policymakers there does not seem to be 
a simple correlation between deportation  and deterring future migration. Managing to 
survive on a day-to-day basis may not offer much of a perspective for future generations, so 
that migration, especially given how tightly it is woven into the history of Afghanistan, 
continues to be seen as a possible strategy for other family members for improving family 
fortunes. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Whether people stay or leave again post-deportation depends on a complex array of factors, 
such as accumulated debt, the loss of opportunities and time, the forging of transnational 
links, and the pressure of shame, factors that state policies do not  take into  account. 
Current frameworks of deportation  by European states include packages of ‘return and 
reintegration’, focusing on training courses and financial assistance. However, these con- 
centrate on the individual as a unit of assistance, taking a very narrow view of the existing 
needs that are for the most part collective and structural. The programmes provided by 
intergovernmental agencies and international  NGOs to persuade forcibly returned  mi- 
grants to stay cannot compete with the pressures on them to leave. States create simplifying 
fictions (Scott 1999) that facilitate the control and management of populations (Hindess 
2000), and  those large agencies and  NGOs are subject to  the  same logic. However, 
short-term (typically 6 months) and simple solutions such as training and business devel- 
opment courses cannot provide solutions to the complex issues outlined above. 
As Scott (1999) more generally, and Castles (2004) in relation to migration, have shown 
these simplified state policies lead to perverse outcomes and to failure, even judged in their 
own terms. Deportation  does not deter undocumented  migration, because the rational 
calculations made by migrants and the migratory pressures to which they are subject are far 
  
 
more complex than a simple risk analysis of the likelihood of being caught and deported. 
It would seem that for those who have been deported, factors such as the need to repay 
debts and remit to dependents, the shame of failure and the difficulties of settling outweigh 
the risks of further deportations, and in fact create additional pressures to leave again. 
Putting this in the context of Afghanistan (although there are clear echoes in the work 
of other scholars cited in this article), deportation is absorbed into the cycle of migration, 
and of return, that is part of the history of Afghanistan and its people. Forced return will 
not deter further undocumented migration, even of those who have themselves been de- 
ported. This then inevitably raises questions about the justifiability of deportation policies, 
in particular to insecure countries like Afghanistan, especially when 2014 promises even 
greater insecurity and uncertainty for its population. It also raises the question of the role of 
humanitarian  and aid organizations depoliticizing this inherently violent state practice 
(Collyer 2012). The authors understand with Gibney and Hansen (2003) that deportation 
has more  symbolic than  real intentions,  that  governments are more  concerned with 
the perceptions of their electorate than pursuing effective policies. Unfortunately, given 
the significance deportation  has acquired as a ‘technology of citizenship’, a means of 
drawing distinctions  between citizens and  foreigners, perhaps  the  most  that  can  be 
hoped for in the Afghan context is a moratorium  on deportations until at least 2015 to 
allow the new government to find its feet. The present international and Afghan political 
and economic contexts make further research that explores the outcomes of deportation for 
those deported, the families, and their communities, and critically engages with deport- 
ation policies urgently necessary. 
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Notes 
 
1. Elsewhere Collyer (2012) and  others have persuasively argued that  deportation  is 
actually about reinforcing the citizen–state relationship and in drawing distinctions 
between citizens and non-citizens. 
2. Or perhaps not—since a clear body of evidence on the inefficacy of deportations would 
make them harder to justify, and as Collyer notes ‘would almost certainly highlight a 
  
range of issues around ill treatment of deportees that it is in the interests of European 
states to overlook’ (2012: 282). 
3. Though we have encountered  this less in the case of Afghans, in ongoing work in 
Uganda, Schuster has encountered Tanzanians and Congolese asylum seekers returned 
to that country from the UK. 
4. We do not insist that those removed have been physically coerced, but that they have no 
choice about returning (see discussion in Collyer 2012). 
5. Because of the circular and constant nature of Afghan migration, it is very difficult to 
cite statistics with any confidence. 
6. Most, though not all, of these studies are on deportations from the USA and Canada. 
Though it is too early to be certain, it seems that whereas European states do deport 
non-citizens with convictions, the proportion of those deported following a conviction 
is higher from North America, and there is a higher proportion  of refused asylum 
seekers and undocumented  migrants from Europe. There also seems to be a higher 
percentage of people who have been in the USA for many years, often most if not all 
of their lives, whereas a greater proportion of those deported from Europe seem to have 
been there for <10 years (these conclusions are tentative because statistical data on 
deportations  are limited and unreliable). This may simply be due to the fact that 
proportionately North America has fewer asylum seekers than Europe. 
7. Many countries depend heavily on remittances from migrants abroad. The United 
Nations Resident Coordinator in Acra noted that ‘returning migrants meant not just 
the possible burden of society supporting them to reintegrate, but a reduction in re- 
mittances which had hitherto supported households and in some cases been the main- 
stay of local economies as was the case in some communities  in the BrongAhafo 
Region’. Source: http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel. 
php?ID=213702. 
8. For this group, to safety concerns may be added the cost and or lack of access to edu- 
cation. This additional concern does not negate the former. Unaccompanied minors in 
France explained to Majidi that after deportation from Iran, a decision is made taking 
into account the age, capabilities, economic resources of, and potential risk to the youth 
in question to send him or occasionally her further abroad, often to Europe. 
9. The picture offered here is somewhat reductive and does not reflect the complexity of 
the reasons why Afghans and others migrate, including adventure, curiosity, marriage, 
and progress to adulthood. 
10. All names have been changed. 
11. The greater expense was related partly to Nooria’s age and gender, but more to being 
accompanied by two children, all of which made safer, and therefore more expensive, 
modes of travel necessary. 
12. This report shows that, on average, Afghans migrating to Iran find employment within 
11 days; and most within a month. As a result they are able to immediately pay back the 
cost of their migration, that is, within the first month. 
13. Similar comments were made by sub-Saharan Africans in Oujda during fieldwork in 
2004. Nathan, from Nigeria, had been deported three times, twice to Lagos and once to 
Morocco. On the last two occasions, the deportations were from Spain and between 
those two deportations  his partner had given birth to a child. He explained that he 
  
 
had been away from Nigeria for 8 years and so his family in Spain were all he had. 
When asked about deciding to leave Lagos again, he responded that he had left Lagos 
each time within a couple of hours—shame preventing him from contacting his family 
there: ‘When I left I wore a suit and had a watch on my wrist and rings on fingers. How 
could I let my family see me like this?’ and he pointed to his tattered tee shirt and jeans 
and his split trainers. 
14. Although in June 2012 the Government of Pakistan announced its intention to deport 1 
million undocumented Afghans from its territory back to Afghanistan. 
15. For some who have been deported, including a handful of people from the UK with 
whom the Refugee Law Project in Kampala are working, deportation sees them trapped 
in a city, cut off from family networks and support, and leads to alcoholism, destitution, 
physical and psychological ill health, sex work and its attendant risks (disease, beatings, 
robbery), and early death. 
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